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Pornography, moral wrongness and ontological pluralism
i
 
 
Introduction 
The motivation of the present discussion arose from a certain implicit intuition used by 
Bernard Williams. In his seminal paper on moral luck, Williams invents a story about an artist 
called Gauguin who abandons his familial commitments in order to pursue the life of an 
artist: 
Gauguin, in our story, is putting a great deal on a possibility which has not 
unequivocally declared itself. I want to explore and uphold the claim that 
it is possible that in such a situation the only thing that will justify his 
choice will be success itself. If he fails... then he did the wrong thing, not 
just in the sense in which that platitudinously follows, but in the sense 
that having done the wrong thing in those circumstances he has no basis 
for the thought that he was justified in acting as he did; while if he 
succeeds, he does have a basis for that thought. (Williams, 1976: 118) 
It is a story for Williams because the Gauguin of which he talks cares about familial 
commitments in a way that the real Gauguin probably did not and the purpose of his 
argument is, as we know, to show that the justification of actions and projects lies outside 
the intentions of the agent and are vulnerable to the vagaries of luck. Thus, the modern 
celebration of autonomy distorts the metaphysical understanding of action and 
responsibility. 
But, that is his argument. 
What interests me about the story is different and is the very aspect which Williams himself 
brackets off even though it is crucial for his own argument to work. It concerns the intuition 
that Gauguin's talent and success as an artist exonerates his morally bad treatment of his 
family or, to put it more colloquially, he is “let off” because he is a great artist. In short, the 
worth of the art justifies the moral wrongdoing that occurred in its making. Had Gauguin 
abandoned his family in order to count blades of grass or to discover the world's best lager, 
his course of action would not justify – never mind how successful he was – the moral 
wrongdoing. In these cases, Gauguin would have been purely and simply self-indulgent. 
There is something about the production of works of art and their value which differentiates 
the creative pursuit from other arbitrary courses of action: it is a worthwhile pursuit and 
involves the creation of value. 
Attitudes towards artists, at least in the West, seem to be determined by, not just the 
tolerance of moral failings, but actually the celebration of them; as though artistic 
production requires some sort of moral transgression. There are a long list of types who fit 
this bill with Lord Byron as the original and paradigmatic example.  Moreover, not just the 
artist but the process of artistic production is seemingly a special moral case: the treatment 
of animals in Damien Hirst’s art is bracketed off because the meaning and the expression of 
that meaning is considered more significant.
ii
 Works of art and the activity of artistic creation 
are a special case whereby normal moral judgements are rendered, somehow, “softer.” 
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Most (but not all) critics of pornography base their arguments on moral wrongdoing.  
Pornography involves the exploitation of the participants (MacKinnon, 1993); the violation 
of the rights of women as a group (Dworkin, 1981; Nussbaum, 1999); the objectification of 
women (Langton, 2009; Nussbaum, 1999) and encourages the maltreatment of women 
(Russell, 1988). The point of the article is to provisionally concede that the production of 
pornography involves moral wrongdoing, but that in and of itself does not necessarily entail 
prohibition and censure of pornographic objects. If it did, many aesthetic objects would also 
have to be prohibited and censured. 
What is pornography? 
 
Here is a list of definitions one will find through trawling through the literature on 
pornography: the production of sexual representation for the purpose of exchange (Huer, 
1987); artistic material with little, if any, aesthetic value (Berger, 1977); the representation 
of persons as mere sexual objects (McElroy, 1997); the representation of institutional 
inequality between the sexes (Dworkin, 1981); and material produced with the aim of aiding 
sexual gratification (Narveson, 1993).
iii
 I shall instead follow a rather insightful 
pronouncement by an American judge: "I can't define pornography, but I know it when I see 
it."
iv
 I offer here an example of what I believe will generally be considered to be 
pornography: 
All at once, I halted, out of breath: I had reached the bushes where the 
shadow had disappeared.  Excited by my revolver, I began looking about, 
when suddenly it seemed as if all reality were tearing apart: a hand, 
moistened by saliva, had grabbed my cock and was rubbing it, a 
slobbering, burning kiss was planted on the root of my arse, the naked 
chest and legs of a woman pressed against my legs with an orgasmic jolt. 
I scarcely had time to spin around when my come burst in the face of my 
wonderful Simone: clutching my revolver, I was swept up by a thrill as 
violent as the storm, my teeth chattered and my lips foamed, with 
twisted arms I gripped my gun convulsively, and, willy-nilly, three blind, 
horrifying shots were fired in the direction of the château. (Bataille, 
1977: 25-6)
v
 
The above passage is sexually explicit and (unlike images or descriptions in a book on 
gynaecology or sexual health) exhibits a function of arousal (though not exclusively). I would 
contend it also exhibits aesthetic features that obstruct it being immediately and 
unreflectively dismissed as not art, of which I shall say a little more below.  
The formal argument 
Here is the first attempt at an argument based on Williams' example: 
  1: Morally undesirable behaviour was necessary for the production of 
Gauguin’s art. 
  2:  The value of Gauguin’s artistic production exonerates his 
 morally undesirable behaviour. 
The argument can be transposed as: 
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  1a: Morally undesirable behaviour is necessary for the production of 
pornography. 
  2a:  The aesthetic value of a particular pornographic object exonerates 
the morally undesirable behaviour involved in its production. 
The first objection is obvious: the analogy is not valid because Gauguin's wrongdoing is 
incidental to his art whereas pornographic production is necessarily an exercise of 
wrongdoing. You can paint pictures such as Gauguin's without abandoning your family, 
whereas you cannot produce pornography without (for example) objectifying or exploiting 
the participants.  
One might want to argue about the necessity of Gauguin's wrongdoing, but his art flourished 
in Tahiti and used the islanders and landscape as aesthetic material. He could not but 
abandon his family in order to achieve his aesthetic success. At least, that is the story we 
should tell. The structure of this argument is interesting because if the aesthetic worth of 
Gauguin’s art negates or excuses his morally bad behaviour, then the aesthetic worth of a 
pornographic object (if meritorious to the sufficient degree) can negate or excuse 
undesirable behaviour involved in its production.  
Premise 1a enforces the main claim of the present paper: the umbrella or constellations of 
arguments caught under the description of “critics” of pornography may be inconsequential 
if this argument is valid because the argument need not deny that the production of 
pornography involves moral wrongdoing. The present argument agrees that the production 
of pornography may well harm individuals or groups, but that this consideration – as in the 
case of other aesthetic objects – does not trump the aesthetic value of the object and so 
cannot, tout court, lead to its prohibition or criminalization. One must first gauge the 
aesthetic worth of an object and only then, if required, the moral status of its production. 
The moral status of its exchange and consumption is perhaps more complicated and shall be 
considered in the concluding pages of the article.  
Considering the argument 
 
Consideration 1:  the difference between Gauguin's production    
  and pornographic production is a matter of the    
  gravity of the wrongdoing involved. 
In other words, one could object that the analogy between the two arguments is misplaced. 
Gauguin's wrongdoing is reprehensible and caddish behaviour, but it is not actually illegal. 
Neither is it seriously wrong behaviour.
vi
 The critics of pornography would assert that the 
production of pornography involves a severity of wrongness that make it not analogous to 
Gauguin's story. 
To take an extreme example, one can imagine a “snuff movie” which involved the actual 
killing of one or more human beings. No matter how well made nor the value of its aesthetic 
representation, such values can never excuse the moral wrongdoing at its heart. Yet, there is 
seemingly no formal difference here: artistic creation requires moral wrongdoing otherwise 
the artistic work will not have sufficient artistic merit. Had Gauguin stayed with his family, he 
may still have painted but he would not have painted as well or to the standard that he did. 
Had the director chosen to simulate the murder rather than film the murder, then the film 
may well have been lacking in aesthetic merit that 
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of pornography would assert that the production of pornography is more akin to a “snuff 
movie” than it is analogous to Gauguin's story. No matter the aesthetic worth of the 
production of the resulting film, it is categorically wrong to kill for the purposes of aesthetic 
value.  
It is obvious that such an argument is best supported by a deontological framework, but 
even a consequentialist would be able to argue that the cost-benefit analysis could never 
(normally) support the good produced by pornography outweighing the good destroyed by 
moral badness. However, if the question is whether the severity of wrongdoing affects our 
attitude towards a work of art, then the answer seems to be a mixture of yes and no. If 
Gauguin’s art was created using the death of a human being and that death was intrinsically 
crucial for the creation of that art, on the surface we would disapprove of that art, but 
would the resulting product have no value because of the process of its production? The 
answer seems to be no and that it would still have value in spite of the process of its 
production. The value of art and its production seem to be separate issues. That the severity 
of the moral wrongness committed in the production process plays a role is undeniable, but 
a distinction between criminal and immoral behaviour may be of some initial use here.   Art 
that is produced through the transgression of uncontroversial legal statutes (rape, killing, 
exploitation) is obviously to be censured.
vii
 Not all pornographic objects involve such 
practices. And the wrongness of rape, killing or exploitation is wrong whether the artistic 
production is pornography, mainstream cinema, painting or even children's books. If this is 
the sort of wrongness that is involved in the production of all objects of pornography, then it 
would be irrational not to agree to its prohibition, just as if this wrongness were involved in 
farming or factory work. If all the critics of pornography want is merely to stop practices that 
involve illegal activities, then their argument is banal and contestable and there is no need 
to discuss “pornography” as a separate issue in ethical and legal philosophy at all.
viii
  
Gauguin's activity probably involved deception and deception is wrong. It is a moral wrong, 
but not always subject to legal sanction nor even strong moral disapproval (although the 
context may sometimes demand either or both of these). The production of most 
pornographic objects would involve wrongdoing akin to Gauguin’s, otherwise the production 
activity, like exploitation in industrial production, would be subject to legal intervention and 
strong moral disapproval. 
Of course, the point of contention of someone like Mackinnon (1993) is that the institutional 
tolerance of pornography is akin to the institutional support of slavery. The legal prohibition 
must follow the moral revelation of pornography’s role in the reproduction of cultural 
conventions of inequality and power relations. Again, though, pornography does not 
necessarily have to reproduce cultural conventions and can often challenge them. 
(Despentes and Coraliè, 2000) And other genres (one thinks most notably of romantic 
comedies) can often be as involved, if not more so, in the reproduction of these cultural 
conventions. So, if such critics hold that pornography is always the reproduction and 
maintenance of institutional inequality, they make a descriptive error (as the Bataille 
quotation above seems to illustrate) and they should be more concerned with the activities 
that promote inequality of which some, but only some, belong to the set of pornographic 
objects. Again, the separate ethical issue of “pornography” seems a distraction from the real 
problem. 
Consideration 2:  Gauguin is not actually exonerated. 
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One might, on the other hand, reject the truth of premises 2 and 2a. It is not that we 
exonerate Gauguin, we just conveniently forget, or dismiss, Gauguin's wrongdoing because 
that is a fault of his character.  We make two judgements: one about his moral behaviour 
and the other about his art. To put it more strongly, one can apply a categorical approach to 
wrongdoing: it does not matter what you bring about if your intentions or actions were 
wrong, they were wrong. So, Gauguin's paintings are valuable, but he has still done wrong 
and should be held responsible as such.  
It seems that this is perhaps a better description of our attitude to artists and artistic 
production. Moral wrongdoing is not exonerated, but is “put up with” or “conveniently 
ignored.” Moral wrongdoing is treated in this way in this instance because of the value of 
what is produced. Of course, though, what the argument does not need to say is that 
Gauguin is exonerated, but only that his moral wrongdoing has to be put against the 
existence of his art. Implicit to such an answer is a commitment to ontological pluralism: 
there is more than one good in this world but given the social and ethical space it is 
impossible to substantiate all goods harmoniously or at one time.
ix
  
Moral value is a good, but so is aesthetic value. We tend to think, theoretically, that the 
former is somehow more valuable or matters more than the latter and when push comes to 
shove in serious cases, this may well be true (as consideration 1 above seems to suggest). 
But it is not so simple; we may not kill or let someone die in order to save the Mona Lisa, but 
most of us would – I would contend – deceive, break promises and possibly harm to save it. 
And, more importantly, ontological pluralism does not require validation through action: it is 
enough that the agent who saves the child from the burning Louvre rather than La Gioconda 
admits what he has done was right but he would still feel remorse for not having the 
opportunity to rescue the painting. He might play various “what if” scenarios through his 
head in the aftermath. As long as the moral wrongness involved in the production is akin to 
Gauguin's wrongness, then there seems to be good reasons to both morally disapprove and 
aesthetically approve simultaneously. Like decisions made in moral dilemma situations, one 
must act and in doing so choose one value over another. But, the feeling of remorse for not 
being able to do the other (even if it were impossible) is enough to testify to  its value. 
Aesthetic value may just come into conflict with moral value even if they are both to be 
rationally supported. Sometimes we side with one, sometimes with the other. 
To support this claim, imagine a counter-factual: would we prefer Gauguin had acted 
morally and his art were never created. Put like this, we can see how the severity of the 
moral wrongdoing plays a role from consideration 1. We can imagine possible worlds where 
specific moral wrongdoing is required for the production of specific aesthetic values, and no 
doubt severe moral wrongdoing (murder, for example) would require the production of 
aesthetic ideals (Shakespeare, Dante, for example). However, lying, deception and so on can 
easily be counterbalanced by greatness in art and being mean-spirited could probably be 
accepted even if the outcome is the most banal of art.  Value judgements involve subtle 
comparisons and evaluations that are grounded in our social existence: the idea that the 
world can actually support categorical morality of the sort demanded by this objection is at 
the heart of Hegel’s revision of Kantian moral philosophy. (Hegel, 1975)  There are many 
considerations, values and preferences at play in our day to day existence that require the 
use of a developed and mature practical wisdom to balance them out. 
To be consistent with these reflections, it seems we would have to change premises 2 and 
2a to: 
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Premise 2:  The value of Gauguin’s artistic production matters more than his morally 
undesirable behaviour. 
Premise 2a:  The aesthetic value of a particular pornographic object may matter more 
than the morally undesirable behaviour involved in its production. 
 
Consideration 3:  pornography is not art. 
One could deny the analogy central to the argument by asserting that a category mistake 
has occurred because pornography can have no aesthetic value because, to put it simply, it 
is not an aesthetic object. Photographs of people's faces on passports are not art; instruction 
manuals of mp3 players are not novels; public information films are not movies and so on. 
Pornographic images and novels are produced in order for consumers to arouse themselves, 
like manuals tell us how to use our mp3 player. To treat them as art is mistaken. Just 
because pornography is expressed in a medium that can also be used to express aesthetic 
objects, it does not make it an aesthetic object: if the baby moulds clay, its “model” does not 
– one may assume – immediately become a statue.  
The first point to make is that much of the material which is the target for the critics of 
pornography involves some narrative, plotting and characterization. Even some of the 
shortest mpegs contain some of these elements. The simplest photographs involve a choice 
of lighting and mise en scene implying a characterization and narrative. Pornographic novels 
are, by definition, novels. It seems that at least some of the objects which would be 
considered pornographic are also aesthetic objects. 
Perhaps this counter argument misses the point, though. Pornography is not art because it 
primarily has a use value and one cannot adopt the attitude of the disinterested observer 
central to the aesthetic tradition. (Kant, 1991) Pornographic images, films and novels are to 
be consumed for the purpose of arousal. An instruction manual is consumed when I need to 
learn how to use my mp3 player and a public information film is to be consumed when I 
need to be reminded of the dangers of drink driving. They can be well written and filmed, 
but such judgments are merely incidental.  These only have value to me when I have an 
interest invested in them (when I want to listen to music on that particular player, or am 
going out for the evening). Pornography is designed for consumption: it consists of small 
snippets like morsels and so it is, at best, a matter of taste and not aesthetic judgement. I 
have no interest in art, except insofar as it is art. 
However, such a distinction is not easy to either identify nor delineate. Many Hollywood 
films are designed specifically for consumption and are disposable. Take an analogy with 
horror films. These have the function of eliciting fear and other similar emotions in the 
audience. That is what makes them belong to a specific genre. One could, if one wanted a 
quick fear fix, no doubt watch a five minute clip from these films. Similarly, romantic 
comedies elicit feelings of hope and joie de vivre and fulfil a need for escapism. We watch 
these films and invest in such art when we have the need for such things and even going to 
the art gallery satisfies some sort of need and is appropriate to certain moods and not 
others. Again, if it were possible, one could design a five minute fix for the need for such 
emotions. That we do not need this sort of fix or cannot satisfy it so readily, says something 
about human needs, desires and the priorities of our culture more than the nature of the 
emotions involved. Polemically, one could ask whether the contemporary experience of art 
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galleries is consistent with the five-minute fix as we flap from painting to painting like some 
sort of aesthetic, art-consuming butterfly. 
Would we want to reduce all of these films to the status of non-art, akin to the instruction 
manual of the mp3 player? It seems that they all satisfy a need or interest in the human 
spirit and can, therefore, be defined as functional objects like pornogarphy. Such 
judgements reflect the equivocal nature of the word “art.” When we say these are not art, 
we mean that they are aesthetic objects, but not good ones. The term “art” can descriptively 
mean aesthetic, in the way that both Pavarotti and Britney Spears (or fill in your favourite 
pop star) are singers and therefore produce art. However, it can also be used normatively, 
meaning an aesthetic object deserving of attention: Pavarotti’s singing is art, whereas 
Britney’s singing is not. To reduce pornography to non-art appears to set the bar too high 
because it rules out too many objects on the basis of controversial evaluative judgements of 
aesthetic value. 
 
Consideration 4:  pornography cannot have the requisite aesthetic value. 
The claim about aesthetic value is, though, an important one and in order to avoid making 
controversial judgements, one may want to admit that pornography is art, but insist that it is 
necessarily bad art. Berger (1977) proposes that pornography is artistic material with little, if 
any, aesthetic value. If his definition is correct, then, pornography is, by definition, bad art 
and even if the formal validity of the argument could be defended, it is immaterial because 
pornography could never have the requisite aesthetic value. As such, given the commitment 
to ontological pluralism, there could never be a case in which pornography would be 
preferred to moral value, no matter how minimal the latter is. (So not even being mean or 
snappy is to be tolerated in the production of pornography!) 
First, pornography cannot be defined as bad art, otherwise Sylvester Stallone's film, The 
Expendables, would be pornography. It is not. Pornography must be sexually explicit bad art 
at the very least, but that again is problematic. The quotation from Bataille illustrates writing 
technique and the novel as a whole, even if a not resounding success, is worthy of aesthetic 
attention. In the passage cited, there is an ironic play with the concept of jouissance as 
death using traditional and hackneyed imagery (compare the Dionysian dance to exhaustion 
with the simple shooting of the gun) as well as the linking of the intimacy between violence 
and sex and the idea of transgression, which are all familiar themes from Bataille. There are 
other examples one could cite: The Story of O, Lucia y el sexo as well as Last Tango in Paris. 
All of these examples exhibit at least a minimal aesthetic value and often more. 
It might be objected that the examples chosen are not pornography. As the definition, 
asserts pornography is bad art, so if something is (minimally) good art, it cannot be 
pornography. So, if we were to ask why Bataille’s passage is not pornography (and perhaps 
eroticism or literature instead), the answer would probably be that it exhibits aesthetic value 
whereas mere pornography does not.  Surely, though, this is a case of begging the question. 
For the argument to work, all that needs to be proven is there are some objects one would 
term pornographic that exhibit aesthetic characteristics. The passage cited is one. The 
examples listed are, I would hold, others. 
 
Consideration 5:  the wrongdoing in the case of pornography is not   
  in its production, but in the exchange and     
 consumption. 
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Finally, one can once more deny the similarity between Gauguin and pornographic 
production, because the wrongness is not located in the production process but in the 
exchange and/or consumption processes. There can be no wrongdoing in consuming a 
painting of Gauguin, but in pornography wrongdoing is repeated every time it is exchanged 
and/or consumed.  
Considering exchange first, one can steal a Gauguin painting or one can not pay tax on it 
when it is purchased. These are instances of wrongdoing in exchange, but they are all 
judgements applied independently of the value of the art and could not entail the 
prohibition or restriction of access to the art itself. The aesthetic value of Gauguin's painting 
cannot justify its being stolen because the painting would have existed had it been stolen or 
not. It would not have existed, had Gauguin not abandoned his family. There is no reason to 
suppose the case of pornography is different from this: as long as it is exchanged legally, 
then there can be no wrongdoing in these transactions.
x
 
Some critics of pornography would assert that the consumption of pornographic material 
harms the consumer in various ways such as seducing them into pursuing worthless activity 
and valuing the wrong sort of goals. Feminist critics would argue that the consumption of 
pornographic material harms women as a group every time it is consumed. Gauguin's 
wrongdoing stops once the painting is produced (or when he dies). The painting then exists 
independently of the wrongdoing. With pornography it is different as its existence 
perpetuates and increases the wrongdoing in a way that Gauguin's painting does not. 
Wrongdoing in consumption is a more subtle consideration. It might just be that critics of 
pornography should ignore the production and concentrate on the wrongness of 
consumption. The objectification and harm of pornography might be wrongdoing committed 
by the consumers and not the producers of the material. If the argument has at least moved 
the debate in that direction, then it has been worthwhile, but let us consider this a little 
more deeply. After all, ontological pluralism still applies: wrongdoing must be put against 
aesthetic value. Imagine that looking at Goya's Saturn Devouring his Son inspired certain 
individuals to be aggressive towards others. Would we then put it away in the gallery's 
basement or in a gabinetto segreto? 
Beginning with the harm to individuals, it seems that such a claim raises a problem with 
liberty: should I be free to consume X if I know that X has undesirable consequences? A 
viewer of Damien Hirst's pickled animals may feel nausea and horror, a smoker may be 
harming his lungs and a mountain climber may be risking physical injury. All of these are 
undesirable consequences but the individual surely has to decide for him or herself whether 
aesthetic value outweighs physical discomfort, whether pleasure is worth more than 
possible disease and whether thrill is worth possible injury. With the consumption of 
pornographic materials, seemingly only the subject can decide if his or her own harm is a 
consequence, whether or not it is worth the payoff. 
The feminist would push the point further: it is not about self-harm, the consumption of 
pornography involves harming others. (Russell, 1988; Mackinnon, 1993) It is more akin to 
smoking in a public place where it is not your harm that is the priority, but harm to others 
who did not choose to smoke but find themselves passively inhaling your second hand 
smoke. Put like this, it is not a matter of liberty or autonomy.   
However, art is itself not responsible for how it is received. Films are certified by age 
restrictions: we protect children from certain scenes because they are not able to control 
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themselves nor respond to the scenes in an appropriate way. That viewing  images has a 
causal effect on certain individuals tells us more about those individuals than about what is 
being viewed. As such, it is a matter of responsibility. Unless pornographic films are designed 
in order to provoke harm to others, like films that provoke racism, then our normal legal 
understanding is that the individual who reacts is responsible and not the film maker 
because how we interpret works of art and how they change our understanding of the world 
about us, is a matter of rational, theoretical activity. The majority of pornographic material is 
intended to arouse and not to incite violence.
xi
 To prohibit certain genres or representations 
is to treat human beings like children and not allow them to order, prioritize and assign 
value to those features of their social and moral existence which would actually constitute 
who they were.
xii
 So, it is still a matter of liberty and autonomy. Admittedly, these assertions 
require better discussion, but the original aim was to consider the production rather than 
the exchange and consumption of pornography. 
Conclusion 
Here is the argument again:  
Premise 1a: Morally undesirable behaviour is necessary for the production of 
pornography. 
Premise 2a:  The aesthetic value of a particular pornographic object may matter more 
than the morally undesirable behaviour involved in its production. 
 
Good art can be pornographic and pornography can be good art, the two are not – as is 
putatively assumed – mutually exclusive. If the formal structure of the argument is valid (and 
we have considered some objections to its validity here), then what is proposed is that some 
aesthetic objects that are nominally included in the set of pornographic objects , even if they 
involve moral wrongdoing, may still be deserving of production, exchange and consumption. 
The point of the article was to see if we concede to the critics of pornography that there is 
moral wrongdoing, could the aesthetic merit of the work trump this judgement and make it 
immaterial. The conclusion is that we should firstly consider the aesthetic merit of a piece 
and then consider its moral status. The approach to pornography that seeks to prohibit and 
restrict its circulation due to some defining features of a work of art basically does so the 
wrong way round. 
All that remains is to locate some aesthetic objects that are valuable enough to merit such 
treatment. And the identification of such objects may well reveal what sort of aesthetic 
values are necessary to be valued apart from and above certain wrongs. A few jump to mind 
and have been alluded to above, but it remains to discuss only one last objection. 
Am I not guilty of redefining pornography to include objects not normally included in the 
set? I still contend that Bataille is an instance of pornography and that if one wants to 
restrict or prohibit pornography or certain types thereof, then one must also ban this novel. 
The sorts of items which critics of pornography are loathe to call pornography are those very 
objects which I believe may well be justified. If this is the case, then there appears to be little 
substantial disagreement between us, only a question of authenticity: to admit that there 
are good and bad forms of pornography. Which is an aesthetic judgement made prior to any 
moral disapproval. And it seems that the critics, too, begin from an aesthetic judgement of 
value and not the moral one as they seem to avow.  
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They just find it difficult to admit this. 
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i  I benefitted from questions and discussions after a version of this paper was delivered at the 
The Sixth International Conference on Applied Ethics at Hokkaido University and I should also like to 
acknowledge the journal’s anonymous referee for many insightful comments. 
 
ii 
 As a member of the Science, Agriculture and Engineering Research Ethics Committee at 
Newcastle University, I know that the status of animals and their treatment, under British Law, is 
covered not by ethical considerations, but by health and safety considerations. I assume it is the same 
for artists: so long as he disposes of the animals parts safely and does not risk cross-contamination, 
then there is no legal case to be answered. 
 
iii  For a very good discussion of the inadequacy of these definitions and an alternative, see Rea 
(2001). 
 
iv  Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio 378 US 184 (1964), cited in West (2004). 
  
v 
 I could have easily added other examples, such as de Sade (1990) or even Lawrence (1997).  
There was also the possibility to describe scenes from films such as Despentes and Coraliè (2000) or 
Medem (2001), but the point was to identify an object we all agree without too much controversy is 
pornographic. 
 
vi  Note that such a judgement involves a great deal of cultural sensibility. Who is to judge what 
is a great wrong and, for that matter, what is great art? In other words, who is to weigh the moral 
values and aesthetic values against one another? It is easy to imagine cultures in which the 
abandonment of one’s family is a much greater wrong than it is in a late modern, capitalist epoch.  
These thoughts return in the next discussion about the values at stake. 
 
vii
  The word “uncontroversial” has been added here as I am primarily concerned with legal 
statutes based on sound rational moral law, such as killing, rape and violent coercion. An anonymous 
reviewer influenced my addition of such a qualification as I was forced to consider cases where art 
could transgress legal statutes as a form of protest in order to bring into focus the irrationality of such 
legal statutes. I thank him or her for the comments. 
 
viii  Of course Mackinnon (1993) holds that all pornographic production is coercion and violence 
and that these are serious wrongs. If Mackinnon is right, then my argument fails unless, as we see in 
the next section, the severity of the wrongness can be counterbalanced by the value of the aesthetic 
production. 
 
ix  There are three main forms of pluralism: hermeneutic pluralism whereby an object is 
partially constituted by the conditions that make it possible and as such the same object can differ for 
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different agents depending on their conditions of experience (Vattimo, 1992); radical scepticism 
whereby one acknowledges that historically agents have been mistaken about values and so, more 
than probably, are still mistaken, so it is best to put questions of value into debates about 
reasonableness rather than rationality (Rawls, 1993); and, finally, ontological pluralism, or the 
rejection of monism as concerns metaphysical accounts of value (Berlin & Williams, 1994). 
 
x  One objection here might be that what is a legal exchange may not be a moral one. Say, for 
example, the British Museum selling the Elgin Marbles to the City of New York. Although not legally 
wrong, many might feel it to be morally wrong. However, I feel that any wrongness in exchange must 
be premised on a wrongness either in production (buying a snuff movie), or in ownership (buying 
stolen goods), or in consumption (legally buying kitchen knives to use in street violence). This is only 
an intuition at this stage and requires more discussion. 
 
xi Two caveats needs to be added here. One, to assume that pornographic material is not 
institutionally structured to incite violence may well be the very point of contention with critics such 
as Mackinnon and Russell, but that involves a more subtle discussion of power and socialization. And, 
consequently, it is not a critique of individual film makers and individual consumers, but social 
conventions and values as a whole. In fact, by silencing pornography, the possibility of bringing to 
light such cultural attitudes may be lost. Two, the essay seems to suggest that there is no connection 
between arousal and violence, or that they are distinct psychological states. This is obviously 
empirically contentious and very much more needs to be said. Unfortunately, here is not the place. 
 
xii 
 More here needs to be said about the relationship between culture and self-understanding, 
but unfortunately there is little time and the ideas are, at present, mostly inchoate anyway. 
 
